Why clean-tech partnerships matter for Europe’s energy security

As the G7 summit kicks off in Evian, France, this week, global imbalances, strategic dependencies and energy security will inevitably be main themes in Europe.

Supply side shocks have been on a relentless roll since 2020, first COVID-19, then Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, followed by critical mineral export controls, and now the ongoing conflict in the Gulf.

New european strategies

Each challenge has increased the ‌will of leaders to respond by strengthening sovereign, strategic autonomy. But for Europe the choice is not binary.

Europe has genuine industrial strengths but rebuilding everything at home fails on cost and time; relying on patchwork tariffs and muddling through their delivery against global market realities, means the problems the EU is trying to address are stuck in a holding pattern of continued reliance on others, demonstrated by ​an increasing concentration of electric vehicles and clean technologies manufactured outside of Europe. Across wind components, grid infrastructure and heat pumps where Europe still has some competitive advantages, the picture is ⁠similar.

These advantages will soon disappear without a practical path forward. France, as the G7 president, with EU support, should be an anchor. The UK, Canada, Japan and others ​share Europe’s exposure and its interests.

As the former Italian prime minister Enrico Letta said at the launch of the “One Europe, One Market” roadmap in April, “scale is power”. Unity is now essential for Europe – nations that were once large in a smaller ​world must cooperate closely in areas where they seek to compete with today’s hegemons. Together, they have the collective resources and critical input – demand – to reshape supply terms that none can achieve alone. And Europe’s ability to lead internationally will also depend on choices it makes at home. New analysis from the Clean Technology Partnerships Initiative (CTPI) identifies priority supply chains in the European economy across batteries, offshore wind, ​grid components, nuclear, green steel and geothermal, where targeted partnerships between allied countries could materially reduce global strategic dependencies.

The crucial challenges for Europe

That architecture has three components. First, Europe must define and defend the sectors where it holds comparative advantage ‌and is ⁠prepared to invest. It should use procurement rules like in the Industrial Accelerator Act and other fiscal and trade tools as genuine leverage, not aspiration.

This would involve trusted partners being “inside the tent” for the chosen sectors.Second, it should enable imports of non-prioritised technologies, including from China, to keep the transition affordable and to minimise inflationary impacts across the economy. Not every supply chain needs to be defended; those that don’t should be open. Third, and most importantly for the G7, participating governments need the practical deal-making support to ​turn political alignment into investments, moving from summits ​to supply chains, project by project.